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Hosanna-Tabor1 concerns the separation of church and state, which is 
an often-misunderstood arrangement that is nevertheless a critical 
dimension of the freedom of religion protected by the First Amendment to 
our Constitution.  For nearly a thousand years, the tradition of Western 
constitutionalism—the project of protecting political freedom by marking 
boundaries to the power of government—has been strengthened by the 
principled commitment to religious liberty and church–state separation.  A 
community that respects both the importance of, and the distinction 
between, independent spheres of political and religious authority is one in 
which the fundamental rights of all are more secure.  A government that 
acknowledges this distinction acknowledges limits to its own reach.  Such a 
government, history shows, will more consistently protect and vindicate the 
liberties of both individuals and institutions. 
The principle of church–state separation—from the time of Becket, to 
Blackstone, to Benjamin Franklin, to today—has long meant, among other 
things, that religious communities and institutions enjoy meaningful 
autonomy and independence with respect to their governance, teachings, 
and doctrines.  This independence, recognized and vindicated in a long line 
and wide array of decisions by the Supreme Court, is entirely consistent 
with the appropriate powers of civil authorities. 
The ―ministerial exception,‖ at issue in Hosanna-Tabor, is a clear and 
crucial implication of religious liberty, church autonomy, and the separation 
of church and state—principles embodied in both the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.  The exception, to use the 
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words of one prominent decision, ―operates to bar any claim‖ by or on 
behalf of a minister—including, but not limited to, nondiscrimination 
suits—―the resolution of which would limit a religious institution‘s right to 
select who will perform particular spiritual functions.‖2  It seems to us that 
because any worthwhile account of religious freedom would respect the 
authority of religious communities to select freely their own clergy, 
ministers, teachers, and doctrines, any such account must include some rule 
like the ministerial exception.  Reasonably constructed and applied, this 
rule helps civil decisionmakers avoid deciding essentially religious 
questions.  In addition, and more importantly, it protects the fundamental 
freedom of religious communities to educate their members and form them 
spiritually and morally.  Although the exception may, in some cases, block 
lawsuits against religious institutions and communities for discrimination, it 
rests on the overriding and foundational premise that there are some 
questions the civil courts do not have the power to answer, some wrongs 
that a constitutional commitment to church–state separation puts beyond the 
law‘s corrective reach.  The civil authority—that is, the authority of a 
constitutional government—lacks ―competence‖ to intervene in such 
questions, not so much because they lie beyond its technical or intellectual 
capacity, but because they lie beyond its jurisdiction. 
For these reasons, over the last forty years every federal circuit has 
adopted some version of the ministerial exception.  From practical 
experience, judges know how employment litigation can entangle a court 
with the decisionmaking of a religious organization in the core matter of 
who is qualified to lead the organization and speak on its behalf.  The wide 
range of judges who have approved of the exception are not trying to avoid 
applying nondiscrimination laws, but are trying to fulfill their parallel 
responsibility to protect religious liberty and church–state separation. 
Other essays in this colloquy focus on the details of this federal case 
law and on the question to what extent the ministerial exception applies to 
teachers in religious schools.  Our primary focus in this piece, drawn from 
an amicus brief we filed in Hosanna-Tabor, is more foundational and 
historical.3  Unfortunately, in its Hosanna-Tabor submissions, the federal 
government has chosen to reject decades of precedent and deny the 
existence of any distinct ministerial exception grounded in the Religion 
Clauses.  It therefore is important to restate first principles and show why it 
is so important that the government respect religious organizations‘ 
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decisions on who are qualified to be their ministers—to perform important 
religious functions.  In this Essay we review centuries of church–state 
history and draw two lessons.  First, the ability of religious organizations to 
choose ministers without government interference is at the core of our 
tradition of institutional religious freedom and church–state separation: 
virtually every major advance in this tradition has involved government 
interference in such choices.  Second, the ministerial exception follows 
naturally from this tradition, and—contrary to the arguments of the 
exception‘s critics—the tradition bars government interference in the 
selection of those performing important religious functions, even when that 
interference is for ostensibly ―neutral‖ or ―secular‖ reasons that do not 
involve the government making explicit theological determinations. 
I. CHURCH–STATE SEPARATION AND THE SELECTION OF MINISTERS 
The separation of church and state is controversial in some of its 
applications, but there is long tradition and broad consensus in favor of at 
least institutional separation.4  While not completely sealed off from each 
other by a ―high and impregnable‖5 wall, the agencies and authority of the 
―state‖ are distinct from those of the ―church,‖ and neither can rightfully 
exercise the core functions of the other.  Indeed, the ―establishment‖ of 
religion prohibited by the First Amendment denotes not just sponsorship or 
financial support of religion, but also ―active involvement of the sovereign 
in religious activity.‖6 
Over the centuries, Western civilization gradually acknowledged an 
―independence between church and state‖ and the ―existence of two 
authority structures.‖7  Since the fourth century, ―Western civilization has 
presupposed that there are not one but two sovereigns.  Each has a 
jurisdiction of legitimate operation, and while there are areas of shared 
cognizance, there are other areas in which each is noncompetent to perform 
the tasks of the other.‖8  Thus, ―[w]hen the civil state overreaches and 
performs a task within the sole province of the church, or misguided 
officials attempt to delegate an exclusive state function to the church, the 
boundary between church and state is transgressed.‖9  This differentiation 
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between political and religious institutions has long been a part of the 
American constitutional tradition, and Americans—despite their diversity 
and differences—have agreed that ―jurisdictional separation of the two 
authorities of church and state best facilitates healthy churches and a 
republic free of civil strife over religious doctrine.‖10 
Although disagreement regarding the precise details of church–state 
separation persists, there appears to be solid agreement that, for example, 
this arrangement does not permit political authorities to delegate core 
government functions to churches.11  Hosanna-Tabor involves what should 
be seen as a complementary principle: government may not insert itself into 
controversies over the ecclesiastical functions of religious organizations, in 
particular, disputes regarding the selection and supervision of ministers.  
Congress, all agree, could not leave it to the United States Conference of 
Catholic Bishops to determine the sanctions for violations of federal drug-
trafficking laws.  It should be no less clear that, just as Congress should not 
attempt to resolve disagreements among Christians about infant baptism, a 
court should not presume to supervise or second-guess a religious 
community‘s selection of one person, rather than another, to be its minister.  
In fact, the Court has long recognized that a key component of religious 
liberty and church–state separation is the autonomy of religious 
organizations over matters of governance as well as doctrine.12 
Both Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, the Establishment 
Clause and Free Exercise Clause, protect this autonomy.  In this context, the 
two clauses overlap and reinforce each other.  The Court typically 
categorizes religion cases under one or the other of the two clauses, but in 
limiting government intervention into internal church disputes, the Court 
has frequently relied simply on ―the First Amendment‖ or ―the Religion 
Clauses.‖13  In Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox 
Church, for example, the Court held that a statute transferring institutional 
authority and property in the Russian Orthodox Church ―violate[d] our rule 
of separation between church and state‖ as well as ―the free exercise of 
 
10
  Id. at 1497. 
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  See Larkin v. Grendel‘s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126–27 (1982) (striking down delegation to 
churches of ―discretionary governmental powers‖ to reject an applicant for a liquor license) (link). 
12
  See Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 116 
(1952) (holding that the First Amendment guarantees ―a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an 
independence from secular control or manipulation—in short, power to decide for themselves, free from 
state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine‖) (link); Watson 
v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728–29 (1872) (noting the ―unquestioned‖ right in America of 
―voluntary religious associations‖ to decide ―controverted questions of faith‖ and matters of 
―ecclesiastical government‖) (link). 
13
  See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 499 (1979) (―the First Amendment‖ and 
―the Religion Clauses‖) (link); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724 (1976) 
(―the First and Fourteenth Amendments‖) (link); Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth 
Blue Hull Mem‘l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449–51 (1969) (―the First Amendment‖) (link). 
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religion.‖14  Indeed, the Court‘s Establishment Clause decisions speaking of 
church–state separation repeatedly emphasize that it protects religious 
communities as well as the body politic.15 
The ―separation of church and state,‖ then, in our tradition ―denote[s] a 
structural arrangement involving institutions, a constitutional order in which 
the institutions of religion . . . are distinct from, other than, and 
meaningfully independent of, the institutions of government.‖16  The 
ministerial exception is just one manifestation of this tradition of 
institutional separation and institutional religious freedom.  At the same 
time, it involves a crucial principle that lies close to the heart of this 
tradition, namely, that government may not interfere with religious 
institutions in controversies concerning their selection and supervision of 
leaders and religious teachers, and secular courts should not entertain 
employee lawsuits ―the resolution of which would limit a religious 
institution‘s right to select who will perform particular spiritual functions.‖17 
II. THE TRADITION OF FREEDOM TO SELECT MINISTERS 
A. History 
The ultimate authority of religious organizations to select and 
supervise their leaders has been vital to the development of institutional 
religious freedom.  Virtually every major advance in that tradition has 
stemmed from some conflict over the government‘s intervention in this area 
of decisionmaking.  Among the best known of such conflicts in European 
civilization was the investiture controversy of the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries, in which popes and monarchs fought over who would have the 
authority to appoint Catholic bishops.18  Pope Gregory VII excommunicated 
German emperor Henry IV over the issue until Henry pleaded with the 
Pope for forgiveness in a blizzard at the Alpine fortress of Canossa.  The 
clash broke out again but was settled in 1122 by a compromise that left the 
Catholic Church with considerable power: ―the emperor guaranteed that 
bishops and abbots would be freely elected by the church alone,‖ although 
he retained the right to invest them with their rights of temporal property. 19  
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  344 U.S. at 110, 119. 
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  See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429, 431, 435 (1962) (―[The Establishment Clause‘s] first and 
most immediate purpose rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy 
government and to degrade religion.‖) (link); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 
212 (1948) (―[T]he First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and government can best 
work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective sphere.‖) (link). 
16
  Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like the Boy Scouts?, 
22 ST. JOHN‘S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 515, 523 (2007) (link). 
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  Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 307 (3d Cir. 2006) (link). 
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TRADITION 98 (photo. reprint 1999) (1983). 
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In England, the famous conflict between King Henry II and Archbishop 
Thomas Becket, which culminated in Becket‘s murder, also stemmed from, 
among several other things, Henry‘s assertion of power to appoint bishops.20 
Because each side in these disputes prevailed only in a limited area—
popes over spiritual offices, kings over temporal matters—the result was a 
―duality‖ of jurisdictions that ―profoundly influenced the development of 
Western constitutionalism.‖21  As a leading authority on the controversy has 
written, ―The very existence of two power structures competing for men‘s 
allegiance instead of only one compelling obedience greatly enhanced the 
possibilities for human freedom.‖22  Although Gregory VII asserted broad 
papal supremacy over civil rulers, what he secured was ―the independence 
of the clergy from secular control‖ in ecclesiastical matters like clergy 
selection.23  This established a ―principle that royal jurisdiction was not 
unlimited . . . and that it was not for the secular authority alone to decide 
where its boundaries should be fixed.‖24  The freedom to select religious 
leaders was a landmark in the development of limited government in the 
West.  By setting the precedent for limited government, institutional 
religious freedom has promoted both political and religious liberty for all, 
believers and nonbelievers alike. 
Early Protestantism, in struggling against the Catholic Church, often 
sought assistance from civil rulers, sometimes to the point of letting them 
control clergy selection and other important religious functions.  As 
Michael McConnell has observed, the Reformation, by ―introduc[ing] 
religious factions to Western Europe,‖ also introduced a ―novel danger[] to 
public peace and freedom‖; the break-up in the universal church made it 
―possible to form national churches . . . which could be more easily 
dominated by the government.‖25  For instance, in the Church of England, 
the most familiar example of an establishment to the American Founders, 
the government appointed (and still appoints) the Archbishop of Canterbury 
and other leading clerics.26  English civil rulers exercised many other 
controls as well: the monarch was the official head of the church and had 
the power to punish heresies, and Parliament enacted the Thirty-Nine 
Articles (the church‘s doctrinal tenets) and the Book of Common Prayer, 
requiring for many decades that most ministers pledge conformity to them.27 
 
20
  See LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH STATE AND FREEDOM 18 (rev. ed. 1967). 
21
  TIERNEY, supra note 4, at 2. 
22
  Id. 
23
  BERMAN, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 87. 
24
  Id. at 269; see also Garnett, supra note 16, at 524–25. 
25
  Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 
103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1513–14 (1990). 
26
  See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *364–83 (link). 
27
  MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, JOHN H. GARVEY & THOMAS C. BERG, RELIGION AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 15 (3d ed. 2011). 
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In rejecting a national establishment of religion, Americans necessarily 
rejected a role for the federal government to choose church leaders.  The 
First Amendment confirms this rejection, as do early practices and policies.  
In 1783, the Vatican proposed an agreement with Congress to approve a 
Bishop-Apostolic for America since the new states were outside English 
authority.  Benjamin Franklin, who received the proposal as ambassador to 
France, replied that ―‗it would be absolutely useless to send it to the 
congress, which . . . can not . . . intervene in the ecclesiastical affairs of any 
sect.‘‖28  The proposal triggered political opposition because the bishop 
would be French, not American.  Opponents urged Congress to reject the 
appointment on that theologically neutral, ―secular‖ ground.  Instead, 
Congress responded that it had ―‗no authority to permit or refuse‘‖ the 
appointment, and the Pope could appoint whomever he wished because 
―‗the subject . . . being purely spiritual . . . is without the jurisdiction and 
powers of Congress.‘‖29  This hands-off attitude toward ministerial 
selections ―was of vital importance to all subsequent American history.‖30 
Secretary of State James Madison reaffirmed the principle in 1806 
when Roman Catholic Bishop John Carroll, again following European 
practice, sought to consult Madison about whom to appoint to direct the 
Catholic Church‘s affairs in the new Louisiana Territory.  After conferring 
with President Jefferson, Madison responded that ―the selection of 
ecclesiastical individuals‖—of church ―functionaries‖—was an ―entirely 
ecclesiastical‖ matter for the Catholic Church to decide, and that he would 
adhere to ―the scrupulous policy of the Constitution in guarding against a 
political interference in religious affairs.‖31 
Throughout his life, Madison viewed the Constitution‘s principle of 
church–state separation as forbidding government involvement in churches‘ 
internal affairs, especially clergy selection.  His first recorded 
pronouncement on religion and government was an impassioned 
denunciation of colonial Virginia‘s licensing of preachers.32  Later as 
President, vetoing a bill specially incorporating an Episcopal church in the 
District of Columbia, Madison objected that the bill enacted ―sundry rules 
and proceedings relative purely to the organization and polity of the church 
incorporated, and comprehending even the election and removal of the 
Minister of the same; so that no change could be made therein‖ by the 
 
28
  1 ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 478 (1950) (quotation 
omitted). 
29
  Id. at 479 (quotation omitted). 
30
  Id.  Note that Congress said that it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, not that it had 
jurisdiction so long as it acted on the basis of a religion-neutral, secular, or nontheological basis. 
31
  Letter from James Madison to Bishop John Carroll (Nov. 20, 1806), in 20 RECORDS OF THE 
AMERICAN CATHOLIC HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF PHILADELPHIA 63–64 (1909) (link). 
32
  Letter from James Madison to William Bradford, Jr. (Jan. 24, 1774), in JAMES MADISON, 1 
LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON: 1769–1793, at 10–13 (1884) (referring to the 
―diabolical Hell conceived principle of persecution‖) (link). 
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congregation or the denomination.33  For Madison, recognition of the 
churches‘ authority to choose clergy went hand in hand with religious 
liberty and church–state separation. 
Other leading founding-era proponents of church–state separation 
likewise understood it to protect religious institutions‘ autonomy over 
clergy selection.  Baptists and other dissenting groups who fought against 
religious establishments in New England and the southern colonies did so 
largely to preserve the autonomy of religious organizations from 
government interference and manipulation.  Isaac Backus, the leading voice 
among Massachusetts Baptists, emphasized dual authorities in An Appeal 
for Religious Liberty Against the Oppressions of the Present Day,34 which 
has been described as ―the best exposition of the eighteenth century pietistic 
concept of [church–state] separation.‖35  According to Backus, ―God has 
appointed two kinds of government in the world, which are distinct in their 
nature, and ought never to be confounded together; one of which is called 
civil, the other ecclesiastical government.‖36  From this distinction, Backus 
directly drew implications concerning the appointment of leaders in each 
institution.  The determination of the ―offices of civil government is left to 
human discretion,‖ but ―in ecclesiastical affairs we are most solemnly 
warned not to be subject to ordinances, after the doctrines and 
commandments of men.‖37  God ―has always claimed it as his sole 
prerogative, to determine by express laws, what his worship shall be, who 
shall minister in it, and how they shall be supported.‖38 
Thomas Jefferson also saw church–state separation as guaranteeing the 
autonomy, independence, and freedom of religious organizations—not just 
churches but religious schools as well.  In 1804, two years after his famous 
letter to the Danbury Baptists in Connecticut endorsing a constitutional 
―wall of separation,‖ Jefferson wrote another letter, this time to the Ursuline 
Sisters of New Orleans, who operated a school for orphaned girls.  The 
order‘s prioress had written to Jefferson asking for assurance that the 
Louisiana Purchase would not undermine their legal rights.  Jefferson 
replied that the principles of the Constitution ―are a sure guaranty to you 
that [your property] will be preserved to you sacred and inviolate, and that 
your Institution will be permitted to govern itself according to its own 
voluntary rules without interference from the civil authority.‖39  Jefferson‘s 
 
33
  11 ANNALS OF CONG. 982–83 (1811) (emphasis added) (link). 
34
  ISAAC BACKUS, AN APPEAL TO THE PUBLIC FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AGAINST THE OPPRESSIONS 
OF THE PRESENT DAY (1773) (link). 
35
  WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, ISAAC BACKUS AND THE AMERICAN PIETISTIC TRADITION 123 
(Oscar Handlin ed., 1967). 
36
  BACKUS, supra note 34, at 9. 
37
  Id. at 10 (citing Colossians 2:20, 2:22). 
38
  Id. (emphasis added). 
39
  1 STOKES, supra note 28, at 678 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (―Be assured that [your 
Institution] will meet with all the protection my office can give it.‖). 
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powerful statement affirming institutional autonomy encompasses the 
freedom of a religious school to select its own leaders, even if his letter 
does not say so explicitly.  Although other arguments would be required to 
show that teachers in religious schools fall within the ministerial 
exception,40 Jefferson‘s letter at least supports the proposition that 
religiously affiliated schools have important interests in the freedom and 
autonomy that goes with church–state separation. 
State religious establishments, several of which continued after 
ratification of the First Amendment, included among their features control 
over the selection and conduct of clergy.  Protests against such controls 
were essential to the successful fights for religious liberty and 
disestablishment in the states.  Under the establishments of religion in New 
England and the southern colonies, civil authorities regulated the conduct of 
clergy in the established church, and at first prohibited, then gave limited 
licenses to, preachers teachers of dissenting sects.  Some regulations of 
preachers had explicitly theological criteria.41  Other regulations did not, but 
nevertheless imposed serious burdens.  For example, in Virginia, licenses 
only allowed named persons to preach in designated places and required 
multiple applications, seriously burdening the Baptist practice of itinerant 
teaching and evangelization.42  In New England, controversies focused on 
whether dissenting clergy would be exempt from paying general taxes (as 
were Congregational clergy) and whether dissenting groups would be 
exempt from paying religious taxes—taxes to support clergy.  Many 
Baptists and Separate (or ―New Light‖) Congregationalists—both intensely 
evangelical groups—believed that personal religious conversion was more 
important for a preacher than professional training.43  Establishment 
proponents, in contrast, believed that teachers of religion should be 
professionally educated, and both Connecticut and Massachusetts reacted 
by passing laws in the mid-1700s ―preventing any church or parish from 
choosing a minister who lacked a college degree.‖44  Such laws embittered 
Baptists, and in 1773 led them to begin a ―massive civil disobedience‖ 
campaign against religious taxes.45 
Finally, and significantly, the ―death-blow‖ to the Massachusetts 
establishment came because of distress at civil authorities overriding 
 
40
  For a brief summary of such arguments, see infra note 57. 
41
  For example, Virginia tried preachers in the 1720s for ―speaking against the canons of the Church 
of England.‖  CHARLES F. JAMES, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
IN VIRGINIA 24 (1900) (link). 
42
  See H. J. ECKENRODE, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN VIRGINIA: A STUDY IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE REVOLUTION 37–39 (1910) (link); JAMES, supra note 41, at 13, 26–38, 41. 
43
  1 WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND DISSENT 1630–1833: THE BAPTISTS AND THE 
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 351 (1971). 
44
  Id. at 363; see also JACOB C. MEYER, CHURCH AND STATE IN MASSACHUSETTS 51 (1930). 
45
  1 MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 43, at 546. 
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churches‘ choices concerning clergy.46  The issue arose from a rule allowing 
each local majority to determine which religious leader would receive the 
proceeds of clergy taxes, subject to dissenters‘ opt-outs.  By the early 
1800s, more and more Congregational parishes split between Trinitarians 
and the growing number of Unitarians.  In several cases, one side 
constituted the majority in the church, the other side the majority in the 
town (or ―parish‖).  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that 
the town‘s vote controlled which clergy member would occupy the ―First 
Church‖ and receive tax funds.47  In the key case, Baker, the majority of 
voters in the town of Dedham called a Unitarian minister, but the majority 
of church members objected and withdrew, taking records, liturgical 
materials, and trust funds with them.48  When the court ruled that the town‘s 
vote—the civil determination—controlled, the previously dominant 
Trinitarians suddenly found themselves on the losing side.  Within a few 
years they ―conclude[d] that a religious establishment was no longer 
workable . . . [and] that disestablishment was necessary to protect the 
church against the control of the nonchurched.‖49  Under Baker, ―the secular 
(non-members) citizens could overrule the communicants (the members) of 
the church.  This was the system of Erastianism from which the original 
Puritan founders of Massachusetts had fled to the New World—the state as 
superior to the church.‖50  As Part III elaborates, the ministerial exception 
aims to prevent the very same harm: a civil body, jury, or judge, overruling 
the selection of a minister made by the religious organization‘s authorities. 
B. Case Law 
Given the importance of clergy selection in our tradition of religious 
institutional autonomy, it is unsurprising that the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly forbidden the government from interfering in religious 
institutions‘ decisions concerning the selection and supervision of leaders.  
The Court in Kedroff invalidated a state statute that transferred authority 
and property in the Russian Orthodox Church from the Moscow Patriarch to 
an American convention.51  The Court held that the state had trespassed on 
what was ―strictly a matter of ecclesiastical government‖: ―the power of the 
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Supreme Church Authority of the Russian Orthodox Church to appoint the 
ruling hierarch of the archdiocese of North America.‖52  Likewise, in 
Milivojevich, the Court invalidated a state court decision that overturned the 
Serbian Orthodox Church‘s defrocking of its American bishop.  The Court 
held that civil courts must accept the decision of a hierarchical church‘s 
tribunal in ―disputes over the government and direction of subordinate 
[church] bodies,‖ including clergy selection and discipline.53  Finally, the 
decision in Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila states that 
―[b]ecause the appointment [of a Catholic chaplain] is a canonical act, it is 
the function of the church authorities to determine what the essential 
qualifications of a chaplain are and whether the candidate possesses 
them.‖54  In short, the importance of organizations‘ control over the 
selection of ministers is recognized in case law as well as history. 
III. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION, SEPARATION, AND FREEDOM 
The ministerial exception follows directly from the principle that 
religious organizations should control the selection and discipline of 
ministers because such matters are beyond the rightful power of civil 
government.  The exception bars any claim by an employee ―the resolution 
of which would limit a religious institution‘s right to select who will 
perform particular spiritual functions.‖55  Unquestionably, a 
nondiscrimination suit seeks to override the church‘s decision concerning 
such ministerial personnel.  The threatened government action is especially 
intrusive when the plaintiff seeks a court order reinstating her to the 
position.  In such a case the court is literally appointing a minister.  But an 
award of damages (including back pay, emotional distress, punitive 
damages and attorney‘s fees) is also highly burdensome since it operates as 
a tax on protected decisions concerning ministerial personnel.  As the Court 
has recognized, ―Fear of potential liability [for employment discrimination] 
might affect the way an organization carried out what it understood to be its 
religious mission.‖56  Accordingly, ministerial-exception decisions 
 
52
  Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 115 (1952). 
53
  Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724–25 (1976). 
54
  280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929) (noting that secular courts must accept ―decisions of the proper church 
tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights‖) (link). 
55
  Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 307 (3d Cir. 2006) (link); see also Schleicher v. 
Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2008) (link).  The absolute bar to liability erected by the 
ministerial exception applies to lawsuits between the minister and the religious organization, or in suits 
by a government agency, like the EEOC, seeking to directly assert the minister‘s interest.  The essence 
of these cases is a dispute over the organization‘s right to select ministers.  In some other cases, by 
contrast, a religious organization‘s selection or supervision of ministers comes into question only as a 
secondary issue in a suit by a third party: for example, in suits seeking to hold the organization liable for 
acts of abuse committed by one of its ministers. 
56
  Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 
U.S. 327, 336 (1987) (link). 
106: 175 (2011) Religious Freedom 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/28/ 186 
recognize why selecting leaders has historically been a very sensitive task 
for religious organizations: 
 
A minister is not merely an employee of the church; she is 
the embodiment of its message.  A minister serves as the 
church‘s public representative, its ambassador, and its 
voice to the faithful.  Accordingly, the process of selecting 
a minister is per se a religious exercise.  As the Fifth 
Circuit explained: ―The relationship between an organized 
church and its ministers is its lifeblood.  The minister is the 
chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its 
purpose.‖ . . . ‖Matters touching this relationship must 
necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical 
concern.‖57 
 
Like religious institutional autonomy in general, the ministerial 
exception rests on both Religion Clauses.  The first ministerial-exception 
case, McClure, held that the application of nondiscrimination laws violated 
the ―free exercise of religion.‖58  But the opinion added establishment-
related language as well, saying that the process of court intervention and 
investigation ―could only produce by its coercive effect the very opposite of 
that separation of church and State contemplated by the First 
Amendment.‖59  One ground for the ministerial exception is that 
nondiscrimination suits will frequently call on civil courts to make 
essentially theological judgments about whether the plaintiff was suited for 
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a religious leadership role or performed it well.  Nondiscrimination suits 
typically turn on questions of ―pretext‖: the employer asserts that it 
discharged the plaintiff for a nondiscriminatory reason, and the plaintiff 
challenges that reason as a pretext for discrimination.60  In cases involving 
personnel with important religious functions, the organization‘s asserted 
nondiscriminatory motive will usually be religious in nature or have 
religious implications.  To decide whether the organization‘s assertion of a 
religious motive is credible, judges and juries inevitably will have to 
examine it closely; they will have to second guess ―[a] church‘s view on 
whether an individual is suited for a particular clergy position.‖61 
The Sixth Circuit in Hosanna-Tabor concluded that such a concern 
was inapplicable in that case.  The court reasoned that Ms. Perich‘s ―claim 
would not require the court to analyze any church doctrine; rather a trial 
would focus on issues such as whether Perich was disabled within the 
meaning of the ADA, whether Perich opposed a practice that was unlawful 
under the ADA, and whether Hosanna-Tabor violated the ADA‖ in the way 
it treated Ms. Perich.62  This conclusion is unsound for several reasons. 
First, the ministerial exception is not designed merely to keep courts 
from deciding contested theological questions.  The exception also protects 
the distinctive religious-freedom interest—deeply rooted in the history, as 
summarized in Parts I and II—that religious organizations should be free to 
choose their leaders.  The question of who will give spiritual leadership to 
the organization is a ―matter[] of church government‖63—of ―prime 
ecclesiastical concern‖64—whether or not a civil court‘s interference 
includes an explicit theological ruling.  If a court reinstates a minister over 
the church‘s objection or imposes a damages award for the church‘s 
decision, the result is no less harmful to the church simply because it comes 
from the application of a theologically neutral rule.  The church still is 
forced to accept, or pay damages for refusing to accept, a leader who it 
believes is unsuitable.  For this reason, most courts hold, as they should, 
that the applicability of the ministerial exception does not depend on the 
church identifying a rationale in ―church doctrine or ecclesiastical law‖ for 
its employment action.65  The Supreme Court‘s rulings confirm that 
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government interference with clergy decisions is barred independent of the 
presence of theological questions.66 
As the history set out above shows, the government can trigger the 
harms that the Religion Clauses seek to avoid—coercion, church–state 
conflict, government overreaching—simply by overriding a church‘s 
decision regarding an individual‘s suitability to serve as its minister.  Under 
the Massachusetts voting scheme for clergy taxes, the majority of town 
voters did not need to state a theological rationale for selecting one 
clergyman for the ―First Church.‖  Rather, they could cast their vote based 
on any factor.  Nevertheless, the distress caused when town voters overrode 
church members‘ wishes was enough to end the Massachusetts 
establishment.  Both the Virginia limit on the number of places where a 
minister could be licensed to speak and the Massachusetts requirement of 
college training for ministers were formally neutral among theologies and 
called for no doctrinal determination.  Yet Virginia‘s jailing of unlicensed 
itinerant preachers provoked Madison to charge ―persecution,‖ and the 
Massachusetts college-education requirement embittered the Baptists 
enough to drive them into ―massive civil disobedience.‖67 
In addition, even if the government claims to rest on a formally neutral 
rule of law in overriding a church‘s choice of minister, this claim frequently 
turns out to be misleading.  Indeed, questions that might seem facially 
nonreligious take on a religious coloration in a dispute between a religious 
organization and one of its ministers.  For example, in Milivojevich, the 
Illinois Supreme Court, in overturning the bishop‘s defrocking, had ―relied 
on purported ‗neutral principles‘ . . . which would ‗not in any way entangle 
this court in the determination of theological or doctrinal matters.‘‖68  
Nevertheless, the Court found that the state court entangled itself in 
religious questions by ―substitut[ing] its interpretation‖ of the church‘s 
constitutions ―for that of the [church‘s] highest ecclesiastical tribunals.‖69  
This pattern repeats throughout history.  Advocates of the Massachusetts 
law requiring college education for ministers, for instance, might have 
argued that it did not reflect any theological determination by the state—
merely a judgment that a preacher of any theology should have formal 
schooling given preachers‘ influence in the community.  But in practice, the 
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requirement implicated the deep theological division between the 
establishment Congregationalists and the evangelical groups over the 
importance of formal learning as opposed to personal religious experience.70 
Hosanna-Tabor exemplifies how theological or religious issues are 
almost impossible to avoid in cases involving employees with spiritual 
duties.  When Hosanna-Tabor declined to let Ms. Perich return from her 
leave in the middle of the semester, she responded by threatening to sue and 
behaving in other ways that the principal and school board regarded as 
confrontational and disruptive.  Hosanna-Tabor believed that her behavior 
violated New Testament injunctions against resorting to civil courts in 
disputes among Christians, and that she had ―‗create[d] upheaval‘‖ at the 
school and demonstrated ―‗a total lack of concern for the ministry of 
Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran School.‘‖71  A majority of the local church 
congregation that sponsored the school agreed and voted to rescind her 
―call‖ to teach.  Ms. Perich claims that these reasons are pretexts for 
discrimination, but her claims require the courts to delve deep into the 
religious motives of multiple church bodies and members.  As Hosanna-
Tabor argues in its main brief, the pretext inquiry ―would necessarily 
devolve into an investigation of the Church‘s beliefs.  Do Lutherans really 
believe in non-litigious, internal resolution of disputes over fitness for 
ministry?  Does that teaching apply to this case?  Did it actually motivate 
the congregation?‖72  Ultimately, the congregation terminated Ms. Perich‘s 
―call‖ because it had lost confidence in her ability to represent Hosanna-
Tabor‘s beliefs and purposes to children in light of her behavior 
surrounding the request to return.  If she were reinstated, every parent and 
every child would know she had defied Lutheran teaching to get there.  
Given those circumstances, it is hard to see how she could be an effective 
―voice to the faithful‖ on Hosanna-Tabor‘s behalf.73  Even more 
fundamentally, though, it is up to Hosanna-Tabor, not a jury or judge, to 
decide whether she could be effective. 
Finally, the ministerial exception protects against the burdens of 
litigation and investigation, independent of the results.  As the Court stated 
in refusing to extend National Labor Relations Board jurisdiction to 
religious-school teachers: ―It is not only the conclusions that may be 
reached by the Board which may impinge on rights guaranteed by the 
Religion Clauses, but also the very process of inquiry leading to findings 
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and conclusions.‖74  If courts permitted nondiscrimination suits to proceed, 
―[c]hurch personnel and records would inevitably become subject to 
subpoena, discovery, cross-examination, the full panoply of legal process 
designed to probe the mind of the church in the selection of its ministers.‖75  
Religious organizations not only suffer direct burdens from such expense 
and scrutiny; they also ―might make [decisions] with an eye to avoiding 
litigation or bureaucratic entanglement rather than upon the basis of their 
own personal and doctrinal assessments of who would best serve the 
pastoral needs of their members.‖76 
CONCLUSION 
The ministerial exception is constitutionally required, historically 
rooted, and essential to limited government and thus to political and 
religious freedom.  However, it does not rest on an assumption that 
religious institutions and employers never behave badly.  Of course, they 
sometimes do, as do we all.  Its premise is not that churches are ―above the 
law.‖  They are not.  Its point is not ―discrimination is fine if churches do 
it.‖  It is, instead, that there are some questions the civil courts do not have 
the power to answer, some wrongs that a constitutional commitment to 
church–state separation puts beyond the law‘s corrective reach, and some 
relationships that government should not presume to supervise, such as the 
relationship between a religious congregation and those who lead it, teach 
the faith, or supervise members‘ moral and spiritual formation. 
To be sure, not every employee of a religious organization is 
―ministerial,‖ for many are not.  And religious institutions—like all 
employers—have legal obligations to their employees, whether ministerial 
or not.  Although there are difficult questions to be asked and fine lines to 
be drawn, when it comes to interpreting the First Amendment‘s boundary 
between church and state, it cannot be the role of civil government to police 
the decisions of religious communities regarding who should be their 
leaders and teachers any more than the civil courts should review disputes 
over the meaning of religious doctrines. 
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